Transcendental freedom and its discontents. by Saunders,  Joe
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
10 January 2019
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Saunders, Joe (2018) 'Transcendental freedom and its discontents.', Con-Textos Kantianos : International
journal of philosophy., 1 (8). pp. 319-322.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2383864
Publisher's copyright statement:
This article has been published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 319 
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS. 
International Journal of Philosophy  
N.o 8, Diciembre 2018, pp. 319-322 
ISSN: 2386-7655 
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.2383864  
 
  
 
 
[Recibido: 10 de septiembre 2018 
Aceptado: 28 de septiembre 2018] 
 
 
Transcendental Freedom and its Discontents 
JOE SAUNDERS• 
Durham University, UK 
 
Abstract: 
 
This introduction briefly lays out the basics of Kant’s concept, transcendental freedom, 
and some of its discontents. It also provides an overview of the dossier itself, introducing 
Katerina Deligiorgi’s discussion of ought-implies-can, Patrick Frierson’s account of 
degrees of responsibility, and Jeanine Grenberg’s treatment of the third-person. 
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Transcendental freedom is one of the jewels in Kant’s system. But what exactly is it? In 
the first Critique, Kant describes it as “a faculty of absolutely beginning a state” 
(A445/B473) and “an independence of […] reason itself (with regard to its causality for 
initiating a series of appearances) from all determining causes of the world of sense” 
(A803/B831). So conceived, transcendental freedom involves the ability to initiate causal 
chains in the world of experience, and is thus is a libertarian conception of freedom. 
To complicate matters, Kant attempts to make this libertarian conception of 
freedom compatible with natural necessity. Transcendental Idealism is the key to this. It 
allows Kant to conceive of everything in space, time and experience as determined by 
natural necessity, but to nevertheless maintain transcendental freedom by locating it 
outside of space, time and experience in the noumenal. Of course, what exactly this means 
is complicated. 
Transcendental freedom is not an isolated concept in Kant’s system. For one, it has 
two moments: a negative moment, independence from all determining causes in the world 
of sense; but also a positive moment, the following of the moral law, or autonomy. Kant 
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thinks that transcendental freedom is tightly connected to morality, as it makes possible 
both our distinctive moral agency and moral status. 
This takes us to the first of our discontents. Schiller worries that Kant’s picture of freedom, 
autonomy and morality is self-alienating. As Katerina Deligiorgi puts it:  
 
Agents may count as autonomous then, insofar as and only to the extent that they are 
able to implement reason's prescription. This is the bare Kantian picture. The 
problem, as Schiller originally put it, is that this is also a picture of self-alienation, 
since parts of one's identity, feelings, emotions, and attachments, are kept at arm's 
length and treated with suspicion (e.g. AW XXb: 280). (Deligiorgi 2018) 
 
In her paper in this Dossier, Deligiorgi attempts a response on Kant’s behalf. She 
investigates the ought-implies-can principle, and argues that a full understanding of this 
reveals how moral autonomy can be expressive of individual autonomy. 
A second source of discontent concerns the dualistic nature of Kant’s conception of 
freedom. Kant conceives of every act as both determined by natural necessity and also 
transcendentally free – independent from determination by all determining causes of the 
world of sense. The worry is that this set up does not allow for degrees of freedom or 
responsibility.  
Recently, Claudia Blöser (2015) has attempted to find a way to mitigate this worry, 
accepting that Kant cannot accommodate degrees of accountability, but arguing that he can 
accommodate degrees of praise and blame worthiness. In response, Saunders (2018) has 
pushed the original objection, arguing that transcendental freedom and transcendental 
idealism constrain Kant such that he cannot adequately accommodate either type of 
degrees of responsibility.  
In the second paper in this Dossier, Patrick Frierson responds to this, offering a 
careful and detailed reply to Saunders’ objections. He also draws upon Kant’s Religion to 
propose a unique way of accommodating degrees of responsibility within Kant’s 
framework. 
Earlier, I noted that Kant locates transcendental freedom outside of space, time and 
experience. This invites some more discontent. First of all, perhaps the most famous 
complaint concerning transcendental freedom concerns Kant’s that transcendental freedom 
is – in some sense – timeless. Kant conceives of everything that happens in time as 
determined, and thereby locates transcendental freedom outside of time. This is an 
understandable manoeuvre, but it creates difficulties for his position. Our freedom appears 
to come and go over time, actions begin and end, deliberation can take time, and it is not 
clear how we are to understand any of this timelessly.  
Secondly, if transcendental freedom is outside of experience, and we cannot have 
knowledge of the noumenal, then it looks like we have an epistemic problem on our hands. 
How are we to know about this freedom? Kant has an ingenious solution here, whereby I 
am aware of the moral law in my own case, and this reveals my freedom to me. And 
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Jeanine Grenberg has recently offered an excellent defence of this first-personal 
phenomenological approach.  
In response, Sticker (2016) has drawn attention to the various third-personal 
elements in Kant’s practical philosophy, and has posed these as a challenge to Grenberg’s 
first-personal account. In addition, Saunders (2016) has argued that both Grenberg and 
Kant face epistemic difficulties when it comes to third-personal knowledge of others’ 
freedom.  
In the final paper in this Dossier, Grenberg responds to both Sticker and Saunders. 
She argues that Sticker overstates her emphasis on the first-person, and discusses the ways 
in which her approach can accommodate third-personal aspects of our moral practices. 
And in response to Saunders, she offers a fascinating discussion of how we might 
encounter the moral obligatedness of others. 
Finally, there are discontents and then there are discontents.  One obvious point of 
departure for some critics of transcendental freedom concerns its libertarian nature. But 
Kant was not interested in a compatibilist conception of freedom, he wanted something 
more ambitious. As noted above, he attempts the unenviable but admirable task of making 
a libertarian conception of freedom compatible with natural necessity. Some critics object 
to his libertarian conception of freedom, where others object to his attempt to make this 
compatible with natural necessity. I think the second complaint is more interesting than the 
first. The debate between compatibilists and libertarians is well-worn, but there is 
something impressive and ambitious about the attempt to make a libertarian conception of 
freedom compatible with natural necessity. Of course though, this comes with problems. 
For what it is worth, I think we need to move beyond Kant here, and attempt to maintain 
transcendental freedom without transcendental idealism. However, that is another story, 
and one that will no doubt face problems of its own. And indeed, perhaps Kant’s own 
account can be salvaged, and I very grateful to the authors of this Dossier for attempting 
this on Kant’s behalf.  
 
 
Bibliography 
Blӧser, C. (2015) ‘Degrees of Responsibility in Kant’s Practical Philosophy’ in Kantian 
Review, 20.2, pp. 183-209. 
Deligiorgi, K. (2018) ‘The 'Ought' and the 'Can'’ in Con-textos Kantianos 
Grenberg, J. (2013) Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological 
Account (Cambridge University Press). 
Saunders, J. (2016) ‘Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental 
Idealism and the Third-Person’ in International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24.2, pp. 
164-82. 
—(2018) ‘Kant and Degrees of Responsibility’ in Journal of Applied Philosophy 
Schiller, F. (1943-) 'Über Anmut und Wurde' in Lieselotte Blumenthal and Benno von 
Wiese, Schillers Werke Nationalausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlhaus Nachfolger). 
 
 
 
 
 
322 
 
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS 
International Journal of Philosophy  
N.o 8, Diciembre 2018, pp. 319-322  
ISSN: 2386-7655 
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.2383864 
 
Joe Saunders 
Sticker, M. (2016) ‘Kant on Engaging Other Agents and Observing Reason at Work’ in 
History of Philosophy Quarterly, 33.4, pp.347-73. 
 
 
 
